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The authors whose articles follow have
undertaken an extraordinarily difficult
task. To evaluate properly the antitrust
output of the Reagan administration,
and thus to be in a position to pre·
dict how its legacy will survive, requires
the analysis of at least five broadly de·
fined categories of tasks. Although each
is interrelated, a comprehensive evalua·
tion should consider the administra·
tion's success or lack of success concern·
ing: 1) Cases; 2) Guidance to Business;
3) Effects on the Rest of the Antitrust
World; 4) Advances in the Antitrust
Field; and 5) Fidelity to the Antitrust
Laws.
My task is to suggest how these five
themes might be analyzed. I do not intend to fill in the framework-to do so
would be an enormous project. My task
instead is to set out some of the factors
involved in this endeavor. Throughout
this article I will use the areas of horizontal mergers and vertical restraints as illustrations. These examples, however, by necessity will be used only in a superficial
manner, merely as a hint of the type of
analysis that should be performed in detail in a proper analysis of the antitrust
lega(:y of the Reagan administration_
The four articles that follow have the
difficult task of helping to fill in the
framework I will construct. None, however, conceivably could come close to analyzing all of the relevant issues accu·
rately and completely. Their mission is
only to start the process.

I. Cases
The first way of analyzing the legacy of
the Reagan administration is in terms of
cases. Perhaps the first question most of
us ask in performing such an evaluation
is, "How many cases of each type of antitrust violation did the administration
file?" Of course, we all understand that
the raw numbers game is far too simple
an analytical tool. In addition to knowing the number of filed cases for each
type of antitrust violation, we also want
to know the percentage the government
won,1 how each case affected consumers,
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and the magnitude of the effects of each
case (i.e., was the case large or smaIl).2
Any rigorous analysis along these lines is
extraordinarily difficult to perform.
For example, what is the optimal number of vertical restraints cases the administration should have brought per year?
The number of such cases brought by
the Reagan administration has, of
course, been close to zero.3 Many believe
that the optimal number is zero, but
other respected analysts believe the optimal number is significantly greater. 4 In
fact, it is difficult to evaluate the welfare
effects of most vertical restraints cases.
In principle, of course, this can be done,
since each successful case involved a
challenge to an exi&ting vertical restraint.
The market(s) can be evaluated both before and after the suit. As a practical matter, however, this task is extremely difficult to perform.
For instance, late in the Carter administration the Federal Trade Commission
prevailed. The Commission hired out·
side economists and devoted a considerable amount of in-house staff time to the
project. Their conclusion was that the
Commission's suits probably helped consumers in ten cases and probably hurt
them in five. 5 Significantly, however, this
study took five years to complete. This
powerfully illustrates how difficult it is to
evaluate the legacy of the Reagan administration. For if we undertake the kind of
rigorous analysis that the task truly reo
quires we might not know the results for

several years.
As another illustration of a the difficulties involved, consider the problems
that inevitably arise in an evaluation of
the administration's horizontal merger
program. We start again with an ideolog·
ical question-what is the optimal number of merger cases that the government
should have brought per year? A recent
head of the Federal Trade Commission's
Bureau of Economics, Dr. Robert Tollison, stated that the optimal number was
zero, that the government should perform a natural experiment and not challenge any mergers_ 6 Most analysts, of
course, disagree with Dr. Tollison and believe that the government should closely
monitor the merger business. Assuming
the latter, how do we know what the optimal number should be? And even if we
can determine this, it becomes quickly
apparent that the number, by itself, tells
us very little, since merger challenges virtually always hover near the margin of
legality, and that margin can shift.
To illustrate, suppose that in 1980 the
government usually challenged a merger
when the Herfindahl increase exceeded
100. 7 Suppose also that the threshold for
suspicion used by the Reagan administration in 1988 is that the HerfindahlHirschman Index increase must be at
least 200 (this seems to be the generally
accepted perception in the private bar,
despite the lower numbers contained in
the Merger Guidelines). Once the antitrust community perceived and adjusted
.Federal Bar News &Journal

to this new, higher threshold, firms
would be more aggressive in their mer·
ger activity. Many mergers that never
would have been attempted eight years
ago (since they would surely have been
challenged) would now be attempted
since the thresholds had risen. Thus, the
number of mergers actually challenged
might be the same in 1988 as in 1980,
except that the market shares of the ones
actually challenged would be two or
three times as large in 1988 as in 1980.
Since the effective threshold for chal·
lenging mergers has approximately dou·
bled, we fairly must conclude that we
have a very different merger policy today
than in 1980.
Whether this policy aids consumers is
debatable, but at a minimum any sensi·
ble evaluation of the merger policy of
the Reagan administration must take this
changing margin into account and look
beyond the number of cases filed per
year. 8 For this reason, even if the number
challenged in 1988 is the same as the
number challenged in 1980, the present
merger policy might be too lax.9
Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult
to evaluate the impact of any individual
merger case. Consider a merger chal·
lenge where the government was success·
ful. We can study the market both before
and after the merger was attempted. But
the market might be the same on both
occasions, since the merger was blocked.
It is close to impossible to predict the
market power and efficiency effects that
June 1988Nolume 35, No.5

fully deters most anti·competitive viola·
tions while successfully encouraging
most pro·competitive practices, it proba·
bly is doing an outstanding job even if it
brings very few cases. We therefore must
evaluate critically what the Reagan ad·
ministration has done to affect business
certainty, to enhance business planning,
and to lower litigation costs.
In undertaking this evaluation, we
might profitably examine the 1982 De·
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines,
which were widely hailed, even by liberal
critics, as doing a relatively good job of
providing certainty to business. lO The
1984 revisions, by contrast, were rou·
tinely criticized, even by conservatives,
for being overly i!ldefinite and providing
inadequate guidance to business. ll A key
provision of the 1982 Guidelines, for in·
stance, stated that efficiencies were not
to be considered in the enforcement de·
cision except in "extraordinary cases"
that were "otherwise close:' By contrast,
the 1984 Guidelines provide that the De·
partment always will consider any
claimed type of efficiency (in manage·
would have occurred if the merger had ment, administration, overhead, etc.)
been allowed to take place, so it is virtu· and then will somehow balance these al·
ally impossible to evaluate a challenged leged effects against any market power
merger when the government is success· effects that the department predicts. The
ful.
1984 Guidelines never state how much
It may be possible, however, to evaluate efficiency will be required to counterbal·
the impact of a merger that the adminis· ance what degree of anticipated market
tration decided not to challenge. In power, or how the two are to be traded
these instances one could compare a off. I2 To be sure, it is controversial
market before the merger to a more con· whether there should be an efficiency
centrated one following the merger. It defense in merger cases. I3 Even if effi·
might be possible to get enough data to ciency should be an explicit defense,
determine whether price and/or effi· however, many believe that the adminis·
ciency had risen because of the merger. tration should get low marks because its
Nevertheless, while this is true in princi· chosen norm of the defense provides
pIe, this task has been made much more very little guidance to business. 14
To make matters worse, it generally is
difficult since the Reagan administration
has eliminated the single best source of conceded throughout the antitrust com·
data for these purposes that had ever munity that the Reagan administration
been constructed-the Federal Trade does not follow its own Merger Guide·
Commission's Line of Business Program. lines. It is hardly a secret, for example,
We may never be able to evaluate rigor· that the market definition standards ac·
ously and systematically the administra· tually used are looser than those written
tion's performance in this area. At best it into the Guidelines, and that the market
will take years to accomplish.
share and market concentration num·
bers actually used are more permissive. I5
Astute lawyers advise their clients of the
n. Guidance to Business
conventional wisdom that the adminis·
tration ignores its own Guidelines. While
A second m£!jor task facing the admin· the Federal Trade Commission in 1982
istration has been to provide guidance to issued its own set of merger guidelines, it
business. One way of describing the en· also has plainly ignored them. In fact,
forcers' role is to envision a cop on the the current Director of the Bureau of
beat preventing bad conduct and provid. Competition, Jeffrey Zuckerman, ac·
ing clear signals to business to modify its knowledged that the Commission actu·
behavior appropriately. If, through effec· ally used significantly higher thresholds
tive guidance, the government success· of suspicion than those contained in the
229

Department of Justice Merger Guidelines_ 16 It may fairly be asked, how good a
job has the Reagan administration done
in providing guidance to business, when
it issues two contradictory sets of merger
guidelines and then follows neither?
Much the same analysis applies in the
vertical restraints area_ The Department
of Justice issued a set of Vertical Restraints Guidelines in 1985_ But, as with
mergers, everyone in the antitrust community knows it does not follow them_ In
fact, one wonders whether the Department of Justice ever has undertaken the
type of analysis dictated by these Guidelines_ Experienced observers know that
the Reagan administration is simply not
interested in bringing vertical restraints
cases (unless a government entity is involved)P Virtually all vertical restraints
challenged in this period have come
from the states and from private parties_
Regardless what one thinks about this as
an ideological matter, the administration's disdain for its own Guidelines
must be evaluated in light of the clarity
of the behavioral signals provided to
business.
A different administration might successfully assert that it brought few merger cases and even fewer vertical reo
straint cases because it didn't have to:
that the business community perceived it
as being so tough and so unmistakably
clear in these areas that virtually no
firms ever attempted illegal activity.

m. Effects on the Rest of the
Antitrust World
A third major task of the federal antitrust enforcers is to influence the other
players in the antitrust world. There are
at least five other important participants
whose presence the administration must
consider, and whom it must seek to influence favorably. Let me briefly outline the
nature of the inquiry that must be made
into these relations by one who desires
to fairly evaluate the antitrust legacy of
the Reagan administration.
A. Congress-Every administration
wants preferred legislation to pass (such
as the proposed Merger Modernization
Act of 1986,18 which Congress did not
enact). There is always some legislation
that no administration wants: the
Reagan administration, for instance, is
generally opposed to the vertical restraints legislation currently progressing
through Congress. 19 One crucial question, therefore, is how well the administration has done in its relations with
Congress.
230

B. The Courts-The administration's
Guidelines are the primary mechanism
by which it seeks to influence the courts.
The Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, for example, routinely are
cited by courts in merger decisions. On
the other hand, the Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines are
rarely cited by the courts. A recent
search uncovered more than 100 vertical
restraints opinions by federal judges that
could have cited the Department's Vertical Restraints Guidelines. Only two did. 2o
The influence of the Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines on the
courts has been minimal. Beyond the
Guidelines, the antitrust enforcers also
file amicus briefs and petitions for certiorari with the courts and, at least during past administrations, have filed test
cases. A second crucial question, then, is
how well have administration efforts in
these areas been received?

Experienced observers know
that the Reagan administration
is simply not interested in
bringing vertical restraints
cases (unless a government
entity is involved).
C. The state antitrust enforcers-How
have the relations been between the federal and the state antitrust enforcers?
Have they harmoniously worked together to help each other bring cases
that benefit the public, or have the federal enforcers been uncooperative, forgetting that our form of government is
one where the states also are supposed to
play an important role? It seems probable that the administration's hostility toward the state antitrust enforcers and the
lack of federal enforcement against both
mergers and vertical restraints were major factors prompting the states to issue
their own sets of guidelines in these areas. 2! One can usefully debate the wisdom of having two sets of guidelines in
each area (three for mergers, when one
includes the Federal Trade Commission's
version). If one is of the opinion this
multiplicity of conflicting guidelines is
undesirable, a large portion of the blame
must be attributed to the lack of federal
cooperation and the paucity of federal
antitrust enforcement in these areas.
The federal "enforcer" created a vacuum; the state enforcers filled it.

D. Other government agencies-The federal antitrust enforcers seek to influence
other government agencies on the federal, state, and local levels. The Federal
Trade Commission's large and active intervention program, for example, started
well before the Reagan administration
but has grown substantially in recent
years. How has this program done in
terms of "bang for the buck"?
E. The private Bar-Private attorneys
look to the federal government for guidance in many ways. How good a job has
the administration performed educating
the private bar and the private business
community? Has the cooperation been
constructive, helping private parties
bring good cases and avoid bad ones?
How good have the administration's outreach and education programs been?

IV. Advances in the Antitrust Field
The fourth main task of any administration's antitrust enforcers is to advance
the state of the antitrust field. Regardless
of one's ideology, surely we all want the
field to progress, both theoretically and
empirically. If the Reagan administration
wants its own policies to live beyond January 20, 1989, it cannot afford to be content with the state of knowledge it found
on January 20, 1981. If the administration's efforts have been limited to the assertion of ideological presumptions and
conclusions, its successors will be relatively free to ignore its accomplishments.
If, on the other hand, the administration
undertook evenhanded research-like
the vertical restraints impact evaluation
study launched during the Carter administration-future administrations will be
far more likely to perpetuate the admin·
istration's policies.
For example, our knowledge about
vertical restraints in 1988 is much more
advanced than it was in 1980. Is any of
this advance due to the Reagan administration's efforts? Has the administration
helped clarify rule-of-reason analysis in
this area? To illustrate the value of advances in our knowledge of vertical restraints, suppose for simplicity that all
instances of resale price maintenance
(RPM) can be explained by two causesfree rider problems and cartels. Also assume that any RPM caused by free rider
problems is good for consumers, and
any RPM caused by cartel behavior hurts
consumers. Suppose also that it is extremely difficult to determine in a litigation setting whether a particular instance of RPM was imposed by cartel
behavior or whether it was designed to
Federal Bar News &Journal

overcome free rider problems.
For any administration 1.'0 make the
optimal policy choice in this area, one
important issue is the relative empirical
importance of these two causes. Suppose, for the moment, that ninety-five
percent of the time RPM is imposed to
overcome free rider problems. Under
these circumstances we might wish for
the government to challenge all in·
stances of RPM despite the fact that do·
ing so would result in harm five percent
of the time. This policy might be the
only way to send clear signals to busi·
nesses not to use RPM and, thus, to inca·
pacitate businesses from using RPM to
harm consumer welfare.22 One of the
tasks of the Reagan administration has
been to promote research to answer such
questions so that future administrations
can fashion a wise enforcement policy. If
even·handed research during the last
eight years were to support the adminis·
tration's view that RPM is virtually always
desirable, this would do much to ensure
the successful continuation of the ad·
ministration's programs. Can this admin·
istration point to such unbiased, careful
research, or instead was it content to conduct only liinited research or to conduct
research as if it knew all the answers? If
the latter is true, its successors cannot be
blamed ifthey give relatively less import·
to the Reagan administration policies
than if the administration had verified
its beliefs with even-handed research.
V. Fidelity to the Antitrust Laws

The fifth broad task for the antitrust
enforcers is to follow the law.23 Regardless of what elements the Reagan-appointed antitrust enforcers believe constitute the public interest, the enforcers
are after all, charged with enforcing existing legislation. This means fidelity to
the congressional intent embodied in
these laws. How well did the administration do in this fundamental area? In the
vertical restraints field this administration has made it clear it would not prosecute a vertical restraints case, absent involvement by some unit of government.
While the system should naturally provide for prosecutorial discretion, we
need to inquire as to when the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion turns into
open disdain for the wishes of Congress_
Even if the Reagan administration's disregard for Congress has not been so blatant that the administration can be held
in contempt, can we conclude that this
was a good strategy for it to pursue? Or
did the administration simply encourage
June 1988Nolume 35, No.5

tighter congressional control and poten·
tially damaging legislation in the area?
In this connection, consider that Section
7 of the Clayton Act clearly was intended
by Congress to impose a more restrictive
merger policy than Section 2 of the Sher·
man Act provides_ The legislative history
is indisputable. 24 Yet, Paul McGrath,
while head of the Antitrust Division, an·
nounced that the Department of Justice
knowingly was using a Sherman Act
standard to evaluate mergers!25 How was
the administration being faithful to the
intentions of Congress? Is it enough for
the administration's antitrust enforcers
to remind us that they were never found
to be in contempt of Congress, or should

their conduct have conformed to a
higher standard of faithfulness to the
law?
As the preceding discussion has
shown, a systematic evaluation of the antitrust legacy of the Reagan administration is a formidable undertaking. The
foregoing contains some of the necessary questions. I don't pretend to have
the answers, and it would be asking too
much of the authors of the articles to
follow to require them to fully answer
them. Each of the authors has, of necessity, only undertaken part of the task of
filling in the analytical framework I have
laid out above, yet each will contribute to
history'S final judgment.

FOOI'NOfES
lIt is often difficult to determine whether the decision to challenge a merger. This is, of
and to what extent the government pre· course, incorrect, and I use this assumption
vailed. Moreover, the government's optimal for simplicity of illustration only.
9Another complicating factor is that the
rate of victory probably is less than 100. If it
wins all its cases it probably has been overly number of large horizontal mergers has
cautious in its enforcement efforts by avoid- risen dramatically since 1980.
ing the stronger defendants.
!OSee Sims & Lande, DO] Adds Revisionist
Even this is far too simple a measure. For Dollop to '82 Merger Guidelines, Legal Times,
example, we must be sensitive to the shrink· June 25,1984, at 15, col. 1.
IlSee id.
ing staff size of the federal enforcement
12See id.
agencies and cast the relevant numbers in
terms of cases per attorney year. We also
13See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considermust ask, if we believe the human capital of ations in Merger Enforcement,"'71 CALIF. L. REv.
the federal antitrust enforcers has decreased 1580 (1983).
14For alternative approaches that provide
dramatically during the Reagan administra·
tion, whether this administration bears re· more business certainty, see id.
15See Sims & Lande, supra note 10, and the
sponsibility for this decline.
3Some early cases were brought by the Fed· sources cited therein.
eral Trade Commission over the objection of
IfiSpeech by Jeffrey Zuckerman before the
Reagan appointees. It hardly seems fair to District of Columbia Bar Association Anticount these as part of their Reagan adminis· trust Section (Nov. 3, 1986).
17See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note
tration legacy. In addition, the federal anti·
trust enforcers have brought vertical re- 3, at 614·15, 637-42.
18S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
straint cases where a unit of government was
19H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
involved. It also seems unfair to count these
20See id. at 641.
as "vertical restraint" cases-they would not
21The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of
have been brought if they were purely pri·
vate, and they only reflect this administra· the National Association of Attorneys Gention's belief that the primary source of anti· eral are reprinted in 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
trust problems is the government. For Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S·4 (Spec. Supp.
further discussion of recent vertical reo Mar. 12, 1987).
220f course, if the percentages were restraint-cases, see Fisher, Johnson, & Lande,
Do the DO] Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide versed, per se legality might be appropriate_
23There is, perhaps, a sixth overall task of
Guidance? 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1987).
the antitrust enforcers. This concerns vari·
4See id.
5See LAFFERTY, LANDE, & KIRKWOOD, IMPACT ous internal matters at the antitrust enforce·
EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ment agencies. For example, did the admin·
VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES (1984). The fifo istration build or dissipate the human
teen cases were chosen because they were capital of the agencies? How well did it insti·
amenable to impact evaluation analysis. See tute and implement affirmative action pro·
grams? How fairly did it treat employees?
id.
6See FlC's Chief &onomist Resigns: Gramm is These goals are, of course, important insofar
Likely Candidate for Post, 44 Antitrust & Trade as they affect the output of the agencies. But
they are also important considered alone.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 227 (1983).
24See Fisher & Lande, supra note 13, at
7The Herfindahl·Hirschman Index is a
measure of market concentration. It consists 1587·93.
25See Henderson, Baldrige Merger Plan Criti·
of the sum of the squares of the market
shares of the firms in the relevant market. cized, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at Fl, F8, col.
For example, the merger of a firm with 10% 6.
of a market and one with 5% would yield a
Herfindahl increase of 100.
8The preceding analysis assumes that mar·
ket share is the only important variable in
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